Second measurements

We check what people say about their own systems and data, using our own code, and publish what we find. Each page has the code to rerun it and the authors' reply. A review of the first month puts them side by side, and the rechecks page reruns them on a schedule. The track record lists every claim we’ve checked, every mistake of our own, and the round trips: Google fixed theirs in seven days, whisper.online in four hours. All the code is in one repository: github.com/MarkovianProtocol/second-measurements, and every check is one row in a dataset on Hugging Face.

61 of 1,003

Plants more than a year late with their 2019 toxic-release forms that ever appear in an EPA case; formal actions fell from 52 a year to 16

SM-016 · EPA · sent, awaiting reply

5.7 s vs 61 min

Slowest tiled CT log against slowest RFC 6962 log to serve our certificate; and Apple’s log list, unchanged since March, still calls 12 closed logs usable

SM-015 · Apple & Chrome · sent, awaiting reply

24 of 331

Roots Microsoft trusts whose newest audit on record is more than 15 months old; Mozilla and Chrome have none

SM-012 · CCADB & Microsoft · sent, awaiting reply

Know a public claim that doesn’t add up? A log that says “every release”, a whitepaper that promises a schedule, a dataset everyone cites. Send it: hello@markovianprotocol.com. We read every tip, and we only take on claims that public data can settle.

Papers

ID	Measurement	Result	Status
SM-016	Toxic-release reports are due 1 July, with a statutory fine of up to $71,545 for each day late. A thousand plants filed more than a year late for 2019, and 61 of them appear in any EPCRA 313 case opened since Measured 2026-10-03 · page sha256 in log leaf 9280 · DOI 10.5281/zenodo.23130553	473,709 forms for 2019 to 2024, 16,522 postmarked after 1 July, 5,964 more than a year after; EPA’s formal EPCRA 313 actions 52, 51, 41, then 16 and 14 a year; 22 federal facilities late and exempt from penalties by statute; EPA has published no 2025 form three months after that year’s deadline.	Sent, response pending
SM-015	Certificate Transparency’s new tiled logs publish in seconds. The old ones take up to an hour, and the browsers’ own log lists are the slowest part Measured 2026-10-03 · page sha256 in log leaf 9259 · DOI 10.5281/zenodo.23123269	43 tiled logs under 6 s; Cloudflare Nimbus 46 and 61 min. Chrome’s policy caps the RFC 6962 merge delay at 4 h while its list says 24; four shards over a year; Apple’s list has marked 12 closed shards usable since March.	Sent, response pending
SM-012	Certificate authorities get 92 days to file their audits. Most file in the last week, one in eleven files late, and Windows still trusts a root whose last audit ended in 2019 Measured 2026-10-03 · page sha256 in log leaf 9258 · DOI 10.5281/zenodo.23123265	108 of 119 audit statements inside 92 days, 11 past, 7 with nothing on file. Roots with audits over 15 months old: Mozilla 0, Chrome 0, Apple 6, Microsoft 24.	Sent, response pending
SM-011	Firefox’s revocation list is months behind the biggest certificate logs. One in eleven top sites, mozilla.org included, gets no revocation check at all Measured 2026-10-02 · page sha256 in log leaf 9271 · DOI 10.5281/zenodo.23123261	Reader 112 days behind Xenon2026h2, 1.66 billion entries unread. 68 of 726 top-1,000 certificates not covered; 346 of 3,792 in the top 5,000.	Sent, response pending
SM-010	Hugging Face says every file goes through its malware scanner. Nothing over 2 GB does, and the badge says safe anyway Measured 2026-10-02 · page sha256 in log leaf 9270 · DOI 10.5281/zenodo.23123005	2,539 of 2,551 files under 2 GiB scanned; 0 of 487 at 2 GiB or more. 476 of those show “safe”.	Sent, response pending
SM-009	Firefox promised a list of every revoked certificate. A third of the ones revoked on day one aren’t on it, and it no longer asks anyone else Measured 2026-10-02 · page sha256 in log leaf 9256 · DOI 10.5281/zenodo.23123001	427 of 465 current revocations on the list. Revoked within 24 hours of issuance: 37 of 108 missing, for up to 28 days.	Sent, response pending
SM-008	A federal directive says CISA rates every CVE. Since March, it has rated almost no Linux kernel bugs Measured 2026-10-02 · page sha256 in log leaf 9264 · DOI 10.5281/zenodo.23122997	1,731 of 1,731 exploited CVEs rated. 1 of 158 sampled kernel CVEs since March.	Sent, response pending
SM-007	Docker promised signed attestations for every Official Image. The attestations arrived; the signatures didn't Measured 2026-10-02 · page sha256 in log leaf 9254 · DOI 10.5281/zenodo.23122993	7,368 of 7,372 Linux images carry attestations. 0 of 45 sampled are signed.	Sent, response pending
SM-006	x402 payments on Base fell by three-quarters in two months, and the same two operators still send most of them Measured 2026-08-05 and 2026-10-01 · page sha256 in log leaf 9240 · DOI 10.5281/zenodo.23122988	234,490 payments a day in August, 63,003 on 1 October. Two wallet groups sent about 80% on both days.	Sent, response pending
SM-005	Meta's whitepaper says its private-AI log refreshes every 3 hours. Since January it's been every 6 Measured 2026-09-30 · page sha256 in log leaf 9239 · DOI 10.5281/zenodo.23122986	Lists every 6 hours, not 3. New software entries in 37 of 70 weeks.	Sent, response pending
SM-004	We tried to catch whisper.online's ledger out. It passed every test, and we found it sending us ten copies of everything Measured 2026-09-12 to 2026-09-30 · page sha256 in log leaf 9238 · DOI 10.5281/zenodo.23071390	Every check passed. A fix took duplicate updates from about ten per change to one.	Confirmed by operator
SM-003	Wild SBOMs was billed as the work of many developers. Nearly half came from one robot Measured 2026-09-30 · page sha256 in log leaf 9237 · DOI 10.5281/zenodo.23123301	Nearly half came from one automated run in 2022.	Sent, response pending
SM-002	The dataset behind 39 studies of Claude Code can see 1 in 11 of its pull requests Measured 2026-09-30 · page sha256 in log leaf 9236 · DOI 10.5281/zenodo.23123115	Its search catches about 1 in 11, and an unusual slice of them.	Sent, response pending
SM-001	Google's Pixel ledger promised every release. January went missing, and stayed missing for eight months Measured 2026-09-15 · rechecked 2026-09-30 · page sha256 in log leaf 9235 · DOI 10.5281/zenodo.23070510	The January 2026 release was missing. Google added it.	Confirmed, fixed

How we work

One sentence an organisation published about itself, recomputed by a path it doesn’t control, then rechecked on a schedule until it ends. The full method and the shape of the thing are on their own page; the claims we have found and not yet measured are on the backlog.

Quote the claim. Every check starts from the organisation’s own words, copied from its own page, saved and hashed.
Name the kill condition first. Before measuring, we write down what result would mean there is no story, and stop if we hit it.
Recompute independently. Our own code, written from the public spec, against public data. Every script is published.
Rerun before publishing. A finding has to hold on a second, separate run.
The subject sees it first, with specific questions. Their reply is printed in full and scored.
No positions, no payments. We hold no stake in anyone we measure, take no money for any measurement, and share nothing before publication with anyone but the subject.
Corrections stay visible. If we got something wrong, the page says so and the old version stays in the log.
The clock runs both ways. Thirty days without a reply, and the status says so in red, counting. Reply, fix it, and let the recheck confirm it, and the paper carries the time you took in green and a seal you can keep.

Checked, nothing found

Claims recomputed by a separate path that held. Each was re-run on the date shown. How close each came.

Date	Claim	Check	Result
2026-09-30	Every entry in the Armored Witness production firmware log names the source it was built from	Each of the 28 entries' `commit_fingerprint` compared with the commit its tag points to on GitHub (script)	27 of 28 match the `v`-prefixed release tag. The recovery image's commit is on `usbarmory/armory-ums` master, but no `0.1.0` tag exists there or in any fork.
2026-09-30	Cloudflare's Plexi auditor has verified every WhatsApp key-transparency (v2) epoch from 722,677 to its reported last verified epoch	150 epochs drawn uniformly from 722,677 to 1,297,263, each audit fetched and its epoch, namespace and digest checked (script). Audit signatures not checked here.	150 of 150 retrievable and consistent.
2026-10-01	A Large-Scale Dataset of MCP Implementations on GitHub (MSR '26) describes real-world MCP development	Their released data and code, and GitHub's counts of matching repositories above and below the code's 50-star minimum (script)	Every repository has at least 50 stars, a cut the paper doesn't state; that is 4.3% of matching repositories. Python and TypeScript lead on both sides of it, and no owner holds more than 1%.
2026-10-01	PyPI: “17% of all uploads to PyPI in the last year included an attestation”, and more than 20% came via Trusted Publishing (2025 in review)	1,000 file uploads drawn from PyPI’s own changelog across 2025 (50 random three-day stretches, 20 files each), each looked up in PyPI’s Integrity API (script)	17.9% of uploads carry an attestation (95%: 15.1–20.8%). Of the files still on PyPI, 20.5%, which is also a floor on Trusted Publishing. 178 of 179 come from GitHub.
2026-10-01	Same Name, Different Server (arXiv 2609.14119): 4.2% of multi-version servers in the official MCP registry moved their endpoint to a different host while keeping their name, which the registry “cannot distinguish” from a takeover	Every version in the registry from its public API, comparing each server’s endpoint hosts between consecutive versions (script)	418 of 10,402 (4.02%) to the end of August. Of the 135 whose name is tied to a verified domain, 116 stayed with that domain’s owner. 283 of the 418 are named after a GitHub account, where the registry checks no domain at all.
2026-10-01	Never Emitted (arXiv 2609.33099): GitHub shows who reported each vulnerability on its advisory but leaves that credit out of the CVE record and its OSV file	The newest 150 GitHub-assigned CVEs whose advisory credits someone, each CVE record read from CVE Services and each OSV file from GitHub’s advisory database (script)	0 of 150 CVE records and 0 of 150 OSV files carry credits; all 150 CVE records carry metrics and problemTypes.
2026-10-02	Homebrew: homebrew-core uses Sigstore “to cryptographically attest to all bottles built in the official Homebrew CI” (2024)	600 bottle files drawn at random from formulae.brew.sh in two independent samples, each looked up in GitHub’s attestation API under homebrew-core’s CI and Homebrew’s backfill signer (script)	599 of 600 attested; every CI attestation carries a Sigstore transparency-log entry. The exception: `ht` 2.1.0’s two Monterey bottles, built 24 April 2024 and still served, which neither signer attests. Reported as homebrew-core#314985.
2026-10-02	NIST NVD: for CVEs in CISA’s known-exploited catalogue, “our goal is to enrich these within one business day of receipt” (from 15 April 2026)	Every one of the 163 catalogue entries added since 15 April, timed from the later of catalogue addition and NVD publication to NIST’s first analysis in NVD’s own change history (script)	163 of 163 within one business day. 68 had been analysed before they reached the catalogue; the other 95 took a median of 19.5 hours.
2026-10-02	Kubernetes: “The Kubernetes release process signs all binary artifacts (tarballs, SPDX files, standalone binaries) by using cosign’s keyless signing.”	Every standalone binary in the latest patch of each minor version from 1.26 to 1.37 (408 files) checked for its `.sig` and `.cert`, and one kubectl signature per version verified with our own code (presence, verification)	408 of 408 carry both; 12 of 12 signatures verify, all from the release identity Kubernetes documents. Certificate chain and transparency-log entries not checked here.
2026-10-02	Proton Mail key transparency: “Normally a ProtonKT epoch should be published every 4 hours. The maximum publishing interval is 72 hours” (whitepaper, p. 14)	Every epoch certificate Proton logged to Certificate Transparency since July, found through Cert Spotter; each certificate’s name encodes its epoch number and issue time (script)	515 epochs, 4 July to 2 October: median interval 4.00 hours; longest 38.1 hours (27–28 September), inside the 72-hour limit. Two epoch numbers at the start of the window aren’t visible, probably expired from the search index.
2026-10-03	CCADB incident-report rules: open reports “MUST be updated: on or before the ‘Next update’ date in the Whiteboard field”, and CA Owners “MUST respond within 7 days” to comments and questions (ccadb.org/cas/incident-report)	Every open bug in Bugzilla’s CA Program tagged [ca-compliance] (92 on 3 October): the Whiteboard’s Next-update date, the assignee, and every comment with its author and time; run twice the same day (script, results)	24 reports carry a Next-update date; none is past it without a CA update. No question from a root program or the community has waited more than 7 days for a CA reply. Two flags on first pass were an administrative note and a community thread with a scheduled date. The rule polices itself: one open report is Microsoft PKI Services filing an incident for having missed its own seven-day update on another.
2026-10-03	CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements 4.9.7: a CA issuing subscriber certificates “MUST update and publish a new CRL at least every seven (7) days”; the CRL profile caps nextUpdate at “at most 10 days after the thisUpdate” for CRLs covering subscriber certificates	Every CRL URL the CCADB lists for its 2,206 not-revoked TLS-capable intermediates (16,141 distinct URLs from 62 CA owners), fetched and parsed: thisUpdate, nextUpdate, issuer, entry count; a 1,500-URL sample fetched again an hour later (script, findings)	15,982 CRLs covering subscriber certificates: median 3 hours old, 99% under a day; median validity 7.0 days, 90th percentile 9.96 days against a 10-day cap. Not one TLS CRL is stale or expired. The five over seven days old are timestamping, qualified-signature and legal CAs the CCADB marks with a server-authentication bit, plus one real one: Brazil’s ITI, trusted by Microsoft alone, serves an EV CRL whose nextUpdate was 24 March 2023, 54 entries, three and a half years stale.
2026-10-03	GitHub: “Public repositories that generate artifact attestations use the Sigstore Public Good Instance. A copy of the generated Sigstore bundle is stored with GitHub and is also written to an immutable transparency log that is publicly readable on the internet.”	The latest release of each of the 1,000 most-starred repositories pushed since September; every attestation GitHub holds for their assets (388 bundles from 63 repositories), each bundle’s transparency-log entry looked up on the public Rekor instance by index (collect, verify)	Every Actions-generated attestation is in the log: 161 of 161 found on Rekor at the stated index. The other 227 bundles are GitHub’s own release attestations, which come with immutable releases: signed by GitHub’s certificate authority with a one-year certificate, timestamped by GitHub, and in no public log. GitHub’s release documentation doesn’t claim one; the sentence above is about the first kind. A verifier of an immutable release is trusting GitHub alone.
2026-10-03	CVE Program, CNA Operational Rules 4.5.1.4: a CNA “MUST publish a CVE Record to the CVE List within 72 hours of Publicly Disclosing a CVE ID”	The newest 780 reviewed GitHub Security Advisories that carry a CVE, each CVE record read from CVE Services; lag is the record’s datePublished minus the advisory’s published time (script, results)	For GitHub’s own CNA, 336 of 336 records were published before the advisory that discloses them, by a median of 26 hours, so the rule holds there by construction. The same is true of VulnCheck (288), OpenJS (84) and HeroDevs (24). The rule is only measurable where a CNA announces first and files later.
2026-10-03	SEC Rule 16a-3(g): an insider’s Form 4 “must be filed before the end of the second business day following the day on which the subject transaction has been executed”; Regulation S-K Item 405: the proxy must name anyone who filed late	Every Form 4 in the latest fiscal year of 498 S&P 500 issuers from EDGAR’s submissions feed (34,490 forms), business days from transaction to filing; the Section 16(a) paragraph of each issuer’s proxy; every form more than five business days late read in full and checked against the proxy (scripts, results)	2,531 forms filed after day two, 279 after day five, across 116 issuers. 188 of the 214 proxies with the section name their late filers, down to a five-share trade. Reading the 279: most of the rest are exempt transfers, plan purchases or inheritances. Two omissions survive: an AutoZone director’s $1.08M sale reported 303 business days late with a proxy that carries no section, and a First Solar controller’s 560-share vest reported 122 days late, likewise. AutoZone’s next proxy is due in late October.
2026-10-04	Charity Commission for England and Wales, annual report 2024–25: “92% of charities were up to date with filing at the end of 2024-25. This represents a significant recovery from 2023-24 (81%)”	The Commission’s own register extract of 4 October 2026 (annual-return history: due date, date accounts received, income) for every registered main charity with income of £25,000 or more, by filing cycle (script, results)	Received by the due date: 81.8% of 67,689 for the 2023 cycle, 91.4% of 71,433 for 2024, 92.6% of the 52,663 due so far for 2025. The Commission’s numbers hold. By income the on-time share is 95%; the late ones are late by a median 45 days, and 408 charities with income over £1 million filed late for 2024, the British Council (56 days) and the Salvation Army (112) among them. The extract carries no row for a return never filed, so non-filers are invisible here.
2026-10-02	Every Certificate Transparency log promises a maximum merge delay: 24 hours for the classic logs, 60 seconds for the tiled ones (the `mmd` field of the Google and Apple log lists; RFC 6962 §3)	A fresh certificate submitted to each of the 64 usable or qualified logs that will take a current certificate (our own chain, SM-009’s certificates with their CCADB intermediates, and entries harvested from 2027h2 and 2028 tiled logs), each log then polled on its own thread until it served the entry: an inclusion proof for classic logs, a checkpoint past the SCT’s leaf index for tiled ones (script, harvester)	64 of 64 inside the promise. Tiled: all 43 within 6 seconds, most within 1. Classic: DigiCert 10 seconds, Google and Sectigo 1 to 2 minutes, TrustAsia 2.5 minutes, Cloudflare’s Nimbus 46 and 61 minutes, the only logs that publish a new tree head less often than every minute. The 24-hour figure Firefox’s revocation filter waits on (SM-009) is a thousand times what the slowest Google log took.
2026-10-02	Debian release team: “Since yesterday, we have enabled our migration software to block migration of new packages that can’t be reproduced or existing packages (in testing) that regress in reproducibility” (debian-devel-announce, 10 May 2026)	Every binary in testing with a rebuild verdict on reproduce.debian.net (36,003), split by what changed since the gate, scored with britney’s own per-binary regression rule, and the remainder crossed with the release team’s public hints and each package’s migration date (script)	457 are unreproducible. 128 were there before the gate; 231 replaced a version that was already unreproducible, which the rule allows; 76 carry a public release-team hint; 10 got their verdict after crossing. The last 12, all `petsc`, are the gate working: britney flagged them in June, the release manager judged them renamed rather than regressed, and waved them through on the record in #1135890. 0 unexplained.